Mr A was 42 years old when I saw him three times over a period of a few weeks in 1979. His own doctor was on holiday and I was on duty. I therefore dealt with a letter from him requesting a certificate. His notes showed that he had had several admissions for myocardial infarct and chest pain (Table 1) and had just come out of hospital after the most recent attack. At midday I received a telephone call to say that he was having another heart attack -'the worst yet'. I found him grey and sweating, rolling from side to side of the bed and clutching his chest. Such a degree of activity suggested that his pain was unlikely to be cardiac, but it frustrated all attempts to get a coherent story and I gave him an injection of diamorphine hoping that I might have five to ten minutes to decide what the problem was before he went off to sleep. The injection made no difference at all; he continued to roll and to clutch his chest and to complain of pain -'a tight band just like before'. It became clear that he was angry as well as fearful; the main fear seemed to be about the sensation of dizziness that came on when he was irritable and tired and that he recalled as similar to his last conscious moments when his heart arrested; he interpreted it as an indication that another episode was impending. He was 'Albert Wander Lecture (abridged) to Section of General Practice, 15 June 1983. Accepted 11 April 1984 angry that nothing was being done to relieve his cardiac problem. After about forty minutes he suddenly said, 'Why haven't the pains gone?' I realized that he thought I had deceived him and had injected an ineffective remedy. The broken ampoule was produced and he made no further complaint.
Mr A had a general approach to problems that he himself expressed in this way: 'If someone won't listen to reason you bash them'. That was the way he managed his personal affairs and that was the way he wished to manage his heart trouble and the doctors looking after him. His inability to do so plus the loss of promotion due to his condition were the main causes of his anger. Two subsequent episodes of chest pain were managed without admission but in 1981 while attending a casualty department in North London with a swollen leg due to a bite of some kind he suddenly started to hyperventilate, complained of chest pain and was admitted to the coronary care unit. That was his last known attendance at hospital.
To which factor should we accord primacy in the causation of Mr A's symptomshis anxiety or his understanding of what his bodily sensations signified? What was it that he expressed as pain that did not respond to the strongest pain-relieving drug that could be given but disappeared with the proof that the drug had been given? And note the views taken of this case by the staff of the three district hospitals and two teaching hospitals concerned: their construction of the clinical reality as they saw itso different to mine (Table 2) .
Recent work on the cognitive aspects of symptoms and of illness provide an alternative approach to the understanding of such cases. I shall deal with doctors' cognitions as well as patients' cognitions. Let us go back to the beginning and consider the series of events that Thank you very much for letting me know about Mr A whose notes have now been found. If his disease is progressing rapidly he could have a by-pass graft put in... around the anterior descending stenosis and probably a second around the total block in the right coronary artery ...
5th September 1973
To GP (from Registrar) Mr A presented to the clinic today clutching his chest, complaining of severe pain, dizziness and extreme dyspnoea... It is possible that this... is due to some ventricular rhythm disturbance [and] some degree of left ventricular failure and .., we have commenced him on lasix and potassium and digoxin ... Teaching Hospital B 19th December 1979 To GP (from Registrar) I saw poor Mr A in the clinic today. Last time we had managed to lose his notes and this time I am afraid the laboratory has lost his lipid results and his full blood count specimen clotted. He looks and feels absolutely well and his blood pressure was well controlled at 130/80. I have repeated the blood test and we will see him in six months. lead from perception of trouble to consultation with the doctor. We must start with some definitions (Table 3) but will have to modify them later on. Illness by Locker's (1981) definition is a social not a medical construct. The same writer has stated that the essential difference between illness and disease is that 'that which is labelled disease has an existence independent of interpretive activity while illness has not' (Locker 1981) . We will see that this too will have to be modified.
Cardiac Department
Symptoms must begin with a change in bodily or mental state or behaviour that is perceived by the individual or by those around him. Most of us have a picture of the normal individual as not being much aware of bodily events. He receives signals but does not seek them out, behaving in fact rather like a wireless set. Yet the evidence that symptoms abound (e.g. Wadsworth et al. 1971 ) runs counter to this simple notion, and Pennebaker (1982) claims that the individual is continually scanning his internal and external environmentthat is to say he behaves more like radar. As a result his nervous system has to cope with such a volume of internal and external information, that, given a limit to the amount that can be processed at the same time, there must be special ways of handling it all. Pennebaker postulates what he calls 'competition of cues' (i.e. if external information is coming in fast there is less time available for processing internal information and vice versa) and hypothetical cognitive structures (schemata, working hypotheses, etc.) that restructure and organize incoming information. An important consequence of conceiving the human being as actively monitoring his internal and external environment is that bias and distortions may occur; the active search for information may be directed in accordance with the hypothesis employed, so that information which confirms the hypothesis will be selectively looked for. What filters through to consciousness as a result of these processes is not necessarily exactly what is picked up by receptors.
It is not surprising, therefore, that symptoms do not appear to reflect precisely changes in bodily 'events' (Blascovitch & Katkin 1983) and that there are variations between subjects. In insulin-dependent diabetic patients, changes in blood sugar levels were associated with changes in symptom-reporting but different subjects reported different symptoms (Pennebaker et al. 1981) . People describe specific symptoms in different ways (Pennebaker 1982a) . They infer what they ought to be perceiving in the light of circumstances (Pennebaker 1982b) . The same experience may be reported by appropriately conditioned individuals as either painful or pleasurable (Anderson & Pennebaker 1980 ). People may attend selectively to different parts of their bodies in order to define the same sensations (Pennebaker 1982a ). Pennebaker's definition of a symptom is therefore wider than that of the Oxford English Dictionary: 'a physical symptom or sensation is a perception, feeling or even a belief about the state of our body'.
When the sensations reach consciousness or affect appearance or behaviour they become what may be called 'problematic experiences' (Locker 1981) , that is to say events or situations that may indicate trouble. They have to be interpreted by the individual or by those around him. The cognitive tools used to interpret all sorts of problematic experiences include commonsense knowledge, categorizing (i.e. sorting phenomena into a limited number of classes) and some theory of meaninghow things happen and why they happen. The individual's purpose in asking these questions is to be able to make an appropriate response. In relation to illness and symptoms a good deal of interpretive work must go on, since only about a third of symptoms reported as being experienced by subjects are taken to the doctor (Wadsworth et al. 1971) .
Two aspects of this cognitive work are of particular importance: the process of warranting the validity of symptoms or of illness and the schemata with which the individual approaches interpretation of bodily sensations.
Lay people use certain tests in defining that someone really is ill (Locker 1981) . Illness is considered something that happens to an individual through no fault of his own and therefore symptoms and behaviour must testify to that. Physical symptoms ensure that the individual is not held responsible for his illness (Racy 1980) . Behaviours considered consistent with and indicative of illness are staying in bed, or staying off work, or going to see the doctor. Judgments may be modified in the light of the general view that children may 'put it on' and that men make much of illness, and in the light of individual biographiesso and so must be ill because he 'never went to bed' or never stayed off work. Acceptance for treatment or admission to hospital are potent factors in warranting the reality of an illness (Locker 1981) .
The concept of schemata is important. These have been defined as relatively enduring cognitive structures which individuals employ to organize their everyday perceptions, experiences and understanding: generalized formulae to which all sorts of problems can be brought for solution. Lay theories of illness (Kleinman et al. 1978 , Hellman 1981 ) are part of this cognitive structure; they affect the way a person interprets problematic experiences, how symptoms are perceived and what symptoms are presented to the doctor.
Mr B is a man in his fifties whom I have looked after for 13 years. As he enters the consulting room his hunted eyes, looking through heavy spectacles, strike fear into the doctor's heart. He is often near to tears. Ostensibly his problem is one of relatively minor respiratory infections occasionally involving the lower respiratory tract. He has a minimal area of bronchiectasis at his left base. All illnesses are associated with excessive sweating and pains in his back. An unusual amount of terror surrounds these events.
His life history provides much happy material for the psychoanalyst. Both parents were crippled, his mother died of cancer in her back; sorrow and guilt surround his absence from home at that time. The doctor can readily interpret his symptoms in line with current psychoanalytic theory. The way Mr B interprets them is quite different and so bizarre that it is difficult to reconcile the two concepts.
He works in a refrigerated store. When he comes out he pours with sweat. His explanation is that while he is in there fluid accumulates in his body and in particular in his legs: 'it seems as if the wetness is in me'. If he did not get rid of the fluid it would give him rheumatism and settle on his chest. Rheumatism is associated with damp and fluid; he must have rheumatism because he gets aches and pains and cramps. When his chest is bad and he has a fever but cannot sweat, this means that he cannot get rid of the fluid. Medicines are only effective when they make him sweat. When they do make him sweat, however, that is an indication of how much rheumatism he has inside his muscles waiting to come out: 'the dampness coming out in me'. The world when viewed in this way is full of terror; 'you're sitting there and you do this with your fingers and they say "crampyou ought to see a doctor"'.
In the eighteenth century, leg ulcers for which no cause could be found were considered to be due to acrid humours in the blood for which the ulcer acted as a drain. These were 'ulcers improper to be healed', because if active means to cure them were employed there was a danger that the humours would ascend and cause 'pulmonic inflammation' which might be fatal (Loudon 1981) . From where did my patient acquire his notions about fluid and sweating and the danger of pulmonary disease? From doctors' cognitions of the past that still persist in lay theories of disease? Or perhaps in each casethe lay person and the medical manwe are observing a not unreasonable first shot at an explanatory model to account for some diseases.
The initial referral of a problem to a particular schema may be made as part of a process of testing possible meanings. The habitual first use of an illness schema may thus influence the individual's perception and interpretation of all problems. Moreover, like Mr B, he will search selectively for information that tends to confirm the schema he employs. The. more information available to him the more likely he is to be able to confirm any hypothesis he wishes (Pennebaker 1982c ). Thus 'schemas may create the behaviour they seek to explain' (Kleinman 1982) . In accordance with the theory he holds, each individual attends to different aspects of the same problem. Hypertensive patients, for example, appear to hold one of three theories: hypertension is a form of heart disease, hypertension is a form of generalized arterial disease, hypertension results from uncontrolled emotion. The first group of individuals are highly attentive to heart-related sensations, the second to numbness and coldness of the limbs and the third to emotional feelings (Pennebaker 1982d) . High symptom reporters are more likely to interpret other events in illness-related terms (Skelton 1980) . In conformity with the theory that in depression there is a cognitive shift so that the depressed person views himself as a loser and as inadequate, all experience is interpreted by him in terms of defeat (Beck et al. 1980) .
To summarize so far. The individual is engaged in actively scanning his internal and external environment and processing a large amount of information about internal and external events and sensations. For the most part these are ambiguous and difficult to evaluate, and their perception and interpretation may therefore be influenced greatly by presumptive organizing mechanisms within the nervous system and by the hypotheses adopted to explain them. The hypotheses employed lead to selective attention and to selective search which may serve to confirm the meaning of the information and to reinforce those hypotheses. Individuals whose 'vocabulary' is poor may have greater difficulty in assessing and expressing vague and perhaps complicated feelings and sensations. Symptoms are thus much less precise and indicative than doctors would like to believe.
Problematic experiences may next be submitted to others for interpretationthe lay consultation system (Friedson 1960) . Everyday language is loose and imprecise, ordinary conversation is not necessarily coherent or logical. People make sense out of random replies to questions (Garfinkel 1967a ) and respond to meaningless phrases in such a way as to make meaning out of them (McHugh 1968) or to unexpressed but mutually understood matters rather than to what is actually said (Garfinkel 1967b) . In other words, the participants do work to make meaning out of any conversation irrespective of the actual content of the utterances. The more often this is done, the more change is to be expected.
An unpublished finding of a study of lay consultation at Thamesmead (Scambler et al. 1981 ) was that some problematic experiences were presented to up to seven other individuals before the doctor was consulted. At each stage the experiences have to be described and may be interpreted anew. It seems inevitable that information must be altered; significant points are identified, possible explanations canvassed and those explanations themselves influence the weight put upon individual elements and lead to a search for supporting data. A process of rehearsal thus goes on in which the principal actor finally writes the script that he is going to present to the doctor. The script may be written in the light of what the actor wants to happen or does not want to happen, that is to say in such a way as to increase or to diminish the chances of the doctor taking a certain course. It is at this stage that the illness is organized, not when it is first presented to the doctor.
The next stage after lay consultation brings together two individualspatient and doctor each of whom has his own schema. The doctor listens to what the patient says and translates it in conformity with his own schemata into medical language so that he can make use of it for diagnosis and treatment.
In the process of translation the status of the information changes. As in the case of other professions, the 'facts' of a case are obtained by applying standard procedures to the accounts given by applicants (Rawlings 1981) ; the raw data are interpreted according to a set of rules and as a result the 'facts' are identified. In this process the data gain in power and meaning; what was previously subjective and questionable has now become objective and firm and can be used to indicate or to justify further action.
Mrs C, born in 1946, moved into our practice in 1971 with her husband and four children. She consulted her doctor 35 times in the first 24 months and in nine of those consultations a complaint of pain was recorded: in the abdomen, perineum or back. She and her husband were at loggerheads; in 1974 she took an overdose and he left home for a while. The notes then record various ups and downs in her life but up to 1977 mention of pain occurred only in relation to two episodes of confirmed urinary tract infection. In 1975 she divorced her husband and in March 1977 took a boyfriend.
Two months' later she attended on two occasions with pain in her knee and in September she 'passed out' at work with pain in the back of her neck and right chest. Her mother at that time was being treated for psychotic depression, her sister's marriage had broken up, her brother had gone blind in one eye following a road traffic accident in which he lost an arm, and her uncle had had a heart operation. On one occasion she went up to the local casualty department with a pain in her chest and was referred to a cardiologist who found nothing abnormal. Subsequently she had four episodes of chest pain and feeling faint. In November she broke up with her boyfriend. In December her brother arranged for her to see a cardiologist privately and he, having expressed an opinion that she had no evidence of heart disease, proposed further intensive investigation in order to reassure her (Table 4 ).
In January 1978 she took another boyfriend and considered marrying him. In May she decided not to pursue treatment as she feared she might end up like her uncle 'with the mind of a six-year-old child'. A further episode of chest pain occurred after she attended the funeral of her ex-mother-in-law, at which her ex-husband was also present. She broke with her boyfriend but he returned and three months later a series of consultations about pain in her neck, abdomen, stomach and back are recorded between September 1977 and May 1980. By September 1980 she had finished with her boyfriend. A further episode of chest pain in May this year led to a brief admission to hospital but I do not know the reason.
If we compare the information contained in the cardiologist's letter (Table 4 ) with the report from the hospital clinic to which he referred her (Table 5) we are struck by the way in which the unimpressive family history and symptomatology have been restated in terms that now have great power; the two opening statements are now the 'facts' of the case and, taken together, can be held to justify the course of action proposed.
This case illustrates also the difficulties we have when pain is the main symptom. Many symptoms are vague and indefinite but pain appears so often to be precise and clear cut; it must be either there or not there. When a patient describes a crushing, constricting, chest pain, especially when related to exertion, are we not to attribute a high value to it as an indicator of cardiac disease? Consider the meaning of pain in this encounter with the unluckiest man in my practice (Mr D, Table 6 ), a Turkish-Cypriot, now in his early fifties who, following a myocardial infarct, had several hospital admissions for chest painsa cycle of events which was only interrupted when he undertook to refuse admission until I had first had an opportunity of seeing him. He feels the weight of his misfortunes (as do I): 'Why me?' 'What have I done that God should do this to me?'. With his complex medical history, chest pains, loin pains, pains in his lower abdomen or in his penis were all explicable in terms of known pathology. One day in response to my opening question, 'What's the problem Mr D?', he said, as he often did, 'Pain'. On that occasion, for some reason, I did not follow my usual instinct to pinpoint the symptom and get on with the problem. If I had said 'where', he might have told me; we might then have focused attention on his heart or his kidney or his bladder. Instead, I said, 'What has happened?' and we concentrated upon his son. She has had about five attacks of syncope... and this can begin with what she calls a pain in the chest or a gripping sensation and just over two weeks ago it radiated to the left arm and also to her neck. The pain is not necessarily exertional...
(No abnormal findings on examination: ECG and Chest X-ray normal). I feel as confident as one can at this stage that, in spite of her family history she, in fact, has no heart disease but we are interested in a syndrome which is almost confined to young women of coronary arterial spasm with what appear to be healthy arteries... This young lady with a bad family history of ischaemic disease presented with a history suggestive of cardiac pain Coronary angiography reveals... some reduction of lumen throughout the left coronary artery... after ergometrine She will have coronary sinus lactate and biopsy studies She will be treated initially with isosorbide and be followed up in the ischaemic clinic. Stengel (1963) pointed out, fairly early in childhood pain and punishment become associated. Mersky (1979) claims that the word only arrived at its present usage, to indicate a specific unpleasant sensation, about a century ago. My Turkish-Cypriot patient may not be typical but perhaps, even amongst English people, notions of guilt or retribution still linger about the word's usage to express unease. That feeling of unease may itself be subject to distortion. Pennebaker (1982e) claims that those factors that influence perception of auditory and visual information also influence perception of physical symptoms and suggests that pain itself serves as a schema by which sensory information may be organized. The extraordinary situations in which intense pain is to be expected but not apparently experienced (Melzack 1973 , Beecher 1966 suggest that the nervous system can deal with sensations related to apparently painful experiences in widely different ways.
From Consultant Cardiologist
Consider also the effect of two sets of cognitions reverberating with each other in the process of consultation. A large part of our daily life is spent questioning people about pain or discomfort of some kind; we have well-practised, systematic ways of handling this complaint. How irritating it is when the person with the pain has difficulty in describing it precisely enough for us and how hard we press him to be more clear. How accustomed, therefore, must lay people become to the way doctors react to such a statement and to the cognitive processes doctors use to interpret and to evaluate it. Add to that the further distortion that may occur in the process of reception by the doctor and reformulation in medical language. Each of these represents perhaps only a small distortion; if we add them up there may be not much effect, but suppose each multiplies the effect of the others?
In eliciting and evaluating the 'facts' the doctor is influenced by his knowledge of medical conditions. Unfortunately, in addition to the inevitable gaps and imperfections in any doctor's knowledge, there are defects in the body of knowledge itself.
Miss E came under my care in 1975 when she was 26 years old. Since the age of 15 she had spent much of her life in hospital. Of the 98 admissions recorded in her notes, 54 were to non-psychiatric units for a wide variety of medical and surgical conditions (Table 7) . Only in the case of a spontaneous abortion and the recurrent dislocation of the jaw (which was self-induced) was there evidence that she actually had a medical disorder. Nevertheless, she had little difficulty in convincing doctors in all kinds of hospitals, including most of London's teaching hospitals, that she had serious medical and surgical problems requiring extensive investigation and treatment. Such a case reveals the inadequacies of medical knowledge in practice and the difficulties of distinguishing between disease and non-disease. Criteria for diagnosis are often elastic or imprecise; general rules are difficult to apply in particular cases. Bloor (1976) , considering the bizarre epidemiology of adenotonsillectomy, came to the conclusion that the body of knowledge available to ENT surgeons is of too broad a type to be applied in practice. The process of grouping phenomena into discrete entities is accompanied by too great a loss of particularity. The ENT surgeon, therefore, must select from what are in effect only guidelines that which will help him to construct his own routines of assessment to apply to the particular circumstances of each case. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are astonishing variations in medical practice even in such apparently straightforward surgical conditions as appendicitis (Bunker 1970 , West & Carey 1978 . The difficulty is (as general practitioners know only too well) that the more specific the rulesevery child with unexplained fever should have a lumbar puncture; every case of rectal bleeding must be sigmoidoscopedthe less helpful they tend to be. It is little wonder that the explanatory models used by clinicians must often diverge from recognized theories if they are to be effective in practice (Kleinman 1982) .
A cognitive theory of health and illness might help us to organize our clinical experience in at least four areas. Firstly, in understanding such cases as Mr A and Mrs C. Mr A's interpretation of dizziness might have affected his perception and interpretation of other bodily sensations; because in the light of that interpretation what he expected to feel was pain (and because pain would explain the sensation itself), perhaps he construed as pain what he felt. We might speculate that the change in his behaviour subsequently was the result of changes in his cognitions about himself and his symptoms and his illness. The experience described constituted a challenge to those cognitions in at least three respects: first the correctness of his analysis of the sensation in his chest as pain, second his interpretation of the significance of dizziness, and third his expectations of the doctor's reactions to his symptoms. In the case of Mrs C, the important points seem to me to be the periodicity (as judged from the clinical records) of the presentation of various pains to the doctor and their relationship to times when intimate relationships were changing. In this case the symptoms may have been indicative not of a medical disorder but of a social disorder. The specific and recurrent complaints of chest pain occurred only after her uncle's illness and operation had had an opportunity of influencing her interpretive mechanisms for her own bodily sensations.
The second area is the relationship between stress and illness. Serious stress of any kind may lead to a radical reformulation of the individual's cognitive structures, since those structures now have to deal with new matters and new problems and new ways of looking at the world. Thus, under stress, the individual's cognitive structures may go through a period of disorganization and then reorganization, during which his perceptions of himself as competent in the interpretation and management of all problems are under scrutiny and under change. In that process his perception of himself as healthy may also be revised.
The third area is the cognitive structures given to doctors by medicine and medical training, and modified by experience in practice. These now become an important field of enquiry and concern. A simple example is the differentiation between illness and disease. We can now see that Locker's (1981) definition of disease is inadequate; there is something missinga no-man's-land between illness and those clinical entities sufficiently well-defined to merit the term 'disease'. In this no-man's-land there exist ? diseases such as deep vein thrombosis that we may have good reason to suspect but for the existence of which in any individual there is no universally available certain test: disorders such as migraineclinical entities for which there is no objective test or in which the test relies upon patient cooperation: marginal types of clinical picture, where some aspects of disease are present and some absent or where the normal shades into the abnormal: and the non-diseases that medicine itself is so good at supplying from time to time, such as visceroptosis in the recent past and coronary spasm in young women in the present. The term 'pseudo-disease' is probably best reserved for this category. Faced with all this it is impossible for us to define disease (as we currently use this term) as something having an existence independent of interpretive activity.
The fourth area is the reverberation between medicine and society, between the schemata of medicine and lay theories of illness. Medicine provides a language and an interpretive mechanism of great power for illness phenomena but, as we have seen, low specificity. It is no wonder that it affects how individuals perceive themselves and their sensations, as exemplified in the case of medical students and the husbands of pregnant women. In both these instances groups of individuals are provided by medical knowledge, itself often ambiguous, with a new framework for identifying and for giving meaning to ambiguous and hitherto neglected bodily feelings (Mechanic 1972) .
A shift of emphasis might help us to establish a theoretical framework for understanding these problems and to provide hypotheses for research. While natural scientists operate on the assumption that there is a basic order that it is the purpose of research to reveal, some social scientists focus upon the means by which individuals create order for themselves out of a disorderly world (Douglas 1974 , Garfinkel 1967 . It is the descriptive and interpretive work that people do in relation to the specific problems that they encounter in daily life that provide order and meaning for them. To understand and to analyse social action, therefore, it is necessary to observe directly the processes by which it is constituted. This is done by the collection of 'accounts' -specific instances of the cognitive work done by individuals by which reality is constructed. The general practitioner has more in common with this school than with the natural scientists, and general practice offers many opportunities for this kind of research (Hellman 1981) . In order to perceive them we have to realize that clinical practice has much in common with the cognitive work done by lay people and that medical knowledge is simply 'a selective schema whose elements owe their place to their pragmatic utility' (Bloor 1976) . A basic assumption of that schema is that symptoms are useful indicators of biological events. That assumption drives us to contortions of speculative thinking in order to explain how social factors and stress lead us to illness. An alternative assumption is to regard symptoms as indicators not of a medical problem but of a disorder that may be wholly social or wholly medical or something in between. This would lead us to concentrate on the mechanisms which lead the individual or the doctor to interpret them in terms of illness. We may then begin to understand why so much in medicine is not what it seems.
